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Abstract 
We propose a simple model that is suitable for evaluating alternative bank capital regulatory proposals for market
risk.  Our model formalizes the conflict between bank objectives and regulatory goals.  Banks' decisions represent
a tension between their desire to exploit the deposit-insurance put option and their desire to preserve franchise
value.  Regulators seek to balance the social value of deposits in mediating transactions against the deadweight
costs of failure resolution.  Our social welfare criterion is standard:  a weighted average agents' utilities.  
We demonstrate that banks do not incrementally alter their portfolio risk as the economic environment changes.
Rather, banks either choose the minimal feasible risk or the maximal feasible risk.  This pattern, in turn, drives
regulatory decisions:  The first goal of the regulator is to induce banks to choose the minimal risk level.  For all
nontrivial cases, unregulated banks fail to choose the first-best allocations.  Traditional ex-ante capital
requirements can induce banks to choose the socially-optimal level of portfolio risk, but the required capital is
often inefficiently high.  In contrast, variants of the Federal Reserve Board's precommitment proposal imply far
smaller efficiency losses, and achieve allocations at or near the first-best for most reasonable model
specifications.  The ex-post penalties required for the optimal implementation of precommitment are not
excessively large.  The welfare gains from precommitment are even higher when the precommitment penalty
function is precluded from sending banks into default.  We conclude that state-contingent regulatory mechanisms,
of which the precommitment approach is an example, offer the possibility of substantial gains in regulatory
efficiency, relative to traditional state non-contingent regulation.       See, e.g., Laffont and Tirole (1993).
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       The precommitment approach was developed in papers by Kupiec and O'Brien (1995a,b).  The Board of
2
Governor's proposal is described in Federal Register, Vol 60, No. 142, pp. 38142-38144. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION
Over the last few years, a good deal of attention has been focused on how to set bank capital standards
for market risk (the risk that a bank's value may be adversely affected by price movements in financial markets).
The risk-based capital standards in the 1988 Basle Accords cover only credit risk.  A proposal to extend these
accords to cover market risk was published in April 1993.  This proposal (known as the "Standardized
Approach") followed the conventional approach of  state non-contingent regulation:  Ex-ante capital
requirements would be determined by the regulator's assessment of a bank's market risk.  The standardized
approach was heavily criticized.  Many industry participants claimed that risk assessments by regulators would
be highly inaccurate, compared with those computed internally by the banks themselves.  In other words, bank
portfolio risk fundamentally represents private information.
     It is noteworthy therefore that subsequent proposals for market-risk capital standards have moved
towards state contingent regulation,  in which regulatory consequences for banks depend on the ex-post
1
performance of the bank's trading portfolio.  For example, the standards adopted in December 1996 base
regulatory capital on banks' own reports of their trading portfolio risk.   State-contingency, in the form ex-post
back-testing, is used to induce banks to reveal truthfully their risk level.  A more innovative proposal
incorporating state-contingent regulation was put forth for comment by the Federal Reserve Board in June 1995.
2
Known as the "Precommitment Approach", this proposal would have each bank state the maximum loss that its
trading portfolio will sustain over the next period.  The capital charge for market risk would equal this pre-
committed maximum loss.  If the bank's losses exceed the pre-committed level, a penalty would be imposed that
is proportional to the amount of the excess loss.        See Kupiec and O'Brien (1997), Bliss (1995), Prescott (1997).
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The precommitment approach has attracted substantial attention from both regulatory economists  and
3
from commercial banks.   However, there is still a good deal to be learned about this proposal.  Under what
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circumstances would precommitment dominate state-noncontingent regulation from a social welfare standpoint?
Would the precommitment approach impose undue costs on the banks themselves?  What would the optimal
precommitment penalty structure look like?   In particular, will the optimal precommitment penalty scheme
require extremely high (perhaps politically infeasible) ex-post fines? 
To address these questions, and to examine the problem of bank capital requirements for market risk
more generally, this paper constructs an optimizing model of bank and regulatory behavior in which bank market
risk is unobserved.  As is typical in welfare economics, our measure of social welfare is an equally-weighted sum
of agents' utilities.  This criterion makes precise the key conflicts between banks' objectives and the regulatory
goals, and formalizes the tradeoffs facing regulators.  Unlike some other papers of this type, our focus is not on
finding a mechanism that achieves the first-best allocation.  Rather, we wish to evaluate regulatory mechanisms
that are either currently in use or under consideration by regulatory bodies.  In particular,  we use the model to
study traditional state non-contingent regulation (ex-ante capital requirements) and two variants of the
precommitment approach.  We compute the socially optimal levels of risk and capital, determine  how closely
the choices of an unregulated bank approximate these socially optimal allocations, and rank the differing
regulatory approaches.
Our approach is closely related to models used in papers by John, John, and Senbet (1991), Giammarino,
Lewis, and Sappington (1993), Gorton and Winton (1995), and John, Saunders, and Senbet (1996).  In all these
papers, banks produce socially valuable liquidity as well as making socially valuable investments.  The regulator
must control the banks' tendency towards excessive risk-taking without unduly suppressing these valuable bank3
activities.  Giammarino, Lewis, and Sappington (1993) and Gorton and Winton (1995) formalize this tradeoff
with a social welfare function similar to that used in our model.  In particular, Gorton and Winton (1995)
formulate a general equilibrium model, in which the regulator chooses allocations to maximize the average utility
of agents in the economy.  In contrast, we use a partial equilibrium approach, in that the risk-free rate is set
outside the model.  
 In our model, the two bank-specific characteristics are the bank's franchise value and the quality of the
bank's loan portfolio.  We assume that these bank-specific characteristics are observable, so bank capital
regulations can be tailored to the characteristics of the regulated bank.  (Alternatively, one can think of this paper
as analyzing a simple economy in which all banks are alike.)  We do so to focus attention on the issue of moral
hazard (unobserved action) in the bank's choice of risk.  Of course, there are a host of important questions that
arise when both bank actions and bank characteristics are unobservable.  To analyze these questions in the
context of this model, one must draw in an essential way on the results in this paper. 
An implication of our model is that the regulator seeks to eliminate all uncompensated (idiosyncratic)
risk in the bank's trading portfolio.  In contrast, an unregulated bank either seeks to eliminate uncompensated risk
or to maximize uncompensated risk.  In effect, banks endogenously sort into prudent banks (those who are most
concerned with maximizing expected franchise value) and risk-seeking banks (those who are most concerned with
maximizing the deposit insurance put option).  The most important goal of the regulator is to induce risk-seeking
banks to behave prudently.  A secondary goal of regulation is to induce the optimal capital structure given that
the bank is behaving prudently.  
For most reasonable parametric specifications, the precommitment approach dominates ex-ante capital
regulation, both according to the social welfare criterion and according to the bank’s own objective function.  The
magnitude of the optimal ex-post penalty under precommitment depends on bank characteristics.  For example,
when banks have high franchise value, the required penalty level is extremely small (less than 5% of the
precommitment violation).  When franchise value is low, however, the optimal penalty can exceed 30% of the      We take deposit insurance as given.  We do not explicitly model the rationale for deposit insurance,
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which has been treated elsewhere (e.g., Diamond and Dybvig (1983)).
  The importance of liquidity services provided by deposits has been noted by many authors.  See Giammarino,
6
Lewis, and Sappington (1993) and the references cited therein.
4
precommitment violation.  While this is a substantial penalty, banks still prefer this penalty level to the optimal
capital requirement under state non-contingent regulation, which can be above 80% when franchise value is low.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows:   Section 2 describes our model of bank activity.
Section 3 describes the social welfare criterion, and characterizes the first-best allocation.  Section 4 characterizes
the decisions of a bank in an unregulated economy.  In section 5, we describe the regulatory mechanisms we
explore:  ex-ante capital requirements and two variants of the precommitment approach.  In Section 6, we use
numerical methods to compare these regulatory mechanisms.  Section 7 summarizes the conclusions we draw
from this paper. 
2.  THE MODEL
2.1 The economic environment 
In this section, we describe in detail a model of bank activity that is suitable for studying capital
regulation for market risk.  There are two time periods, and two types of agents (households and banks), along
with a bank regulator.  All agents are risk-neutral price takers.  We assume that the risk-free return is set outside
the banking sector, and we normalize the gross risk-free rate to unity.
2.2 Households
In the first period, the household can invest in bank equity and bank deposits.  Deposits are government
insured,  and provide liquidity services to households.  In particular, let D denote the face value of deposits held
5
by a household.  We assume that the liquidity services generated by these deposits have a consumption-good-
equivalent of DD (where D is a strictly positive parameter).   The parameter D gives the relative benefits of
6pd ’ 1%D; pz ’ E ˜ v .
  All of our results go through if D is interpreted as the relative deadweight cost of issuing equity, rather than the
7
relative social benefit to issuing deposits.
  If a bank can perfectly hedge all residual market risk, and if it faces no counterparty risk, then F  would equal
8
0
zero.  Otherwise, F  would exceed zero. 0
  In practice, the exact level of ¯ F is unimportant, as long as it is sufficiently high.  While the value of the
9
deposit insurance put option is increasing in F, it asymptotes to a constant as F64.  Therefore, the problem is
well-behaved even if ¯ F = 4. In our simulations, we set ¯ F sufficiently high to approximate infinite risk.
5
(1)
deposits versus equity in our model.  It gives rise to a wedge between the cost of equity financing to the bank and
the cost of deposits.  An alternate justification for this wedge would be the "lemons" cost associated with the sale
of equity.  (See Gorton and Winton (1996)).   
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Let p  denote the price of one unit (face value, in units of the consumption good) of bank deposits, let d
p denote the price per share of bank equity, (with the number of shares normalized to unity) and let ˜ v denote the z
stochastic payoff (to be formalized later) to a share of bank equity.  The expected returns to deposits (inclusive
of the liquidity value D) and to bank equity must equal to the risk-free rate of unity, implying
2.3 Banks
2.3.1 The trading portfolio
There are two types of bank assets: loans and marketable securities.  The latter compose the bank's
trading portfolio.  Since the trading portfolio exhibits constant returns to scale, risk neutrality would imply that
the optimal portfolio size is indeterminate.  For this reason, we fix the size of the trading portfolio exogenously.
Without loss of generality, we normalize this size to unity.
The gross return to the trading portfolio is denoted ˜ r.  It is assumed that ˜ r is a log-normal random variable
with mean µ > 1 (a constant parameter) and standard deviation F (a choice variable of the bank), where F 0 [F , 0
¯ F].  Parameter F  is the minimum standard deviation that a bank can choose for its trading portfolio.   For 0
8
technical convenience we impose a finite upper bound ¯ F on the bank's risk choice.   Let f(˜ r*F) denote the log
9pdD % pzZ ’ 1
  In an earlier version of this paper, we also allowed the bank to include risk-free investments in its trading
10
portfolio.  For reasonable specifications of µ > 0, however, we found that the optimal weight on the risk-free
asset was always zero.
 Gennotte and Pyle (1991) argue that, under some ad hoc specifications of the investment opportunity set,
11
increased capital requirements can induce banks to increase risk.  Our specification avoids this perverse result.
See also Keeley and Furlong (1990).
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(2)
normal density function with mean µ and standard deviation F, and let F(˜ r*F) denote the corresponding
cumulative distribution function. 
Note that there is no "risk-return" tradeoff.  Regardless of the level of risk F chosen by the bank, the
mean return is still µ. Essentially, this is an assumption of mean-variance efficiency:  A higher mean return is only
justified as  compensation for extra risk.  In our economy, all agents are risk-neutral, so there is never
compensation for additional risk.  If the trading portfolio paid the risk-free return on average, one would set µ
= 1.  However, the trading portfolio would then represent a zero net present value investment, and would provide
no net social value.  The optimal regulatory strategy would then be to prohibit banks entirely from trading.  To
avoid this trivial conclusion, we assume that µ exceeds the risk-free rate of unity.   This assumption can be
10
justified if banks have special expertise in performing certain valued trading activities (such as acting as
counterparty to swaps transactions for commercial clients), and if there are economies of scale or other natural
barriers to entering this activity. (One such barrier might be the informational monopoly a bank possesses with
respect to its clients.  See Petersen and Rajan (1994)).  
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The bank must fund the trading portfolio by selling a combination of deposits and outside equity to the
households.  This funding constraint can be written: 
where Z denotes the fraction of bank equity sold to the households.  The bank can short-sell neither deposits nor
equity, so D $ 0; 0 # Z # 1.
K(D) ’ 1 & (1%D)D
˜ x ’
x with probability p









For regulatory purposes, we measure bank capital as pZ, the value of outside equity at the time it is issued.  Note z
that equations (1) and (2) associate each level of D with a particular capital ratio (denoted K(D)), defined as the
ratio of p Z to the size of the trading portfolio: z
2.3.2  The loan portfolio
While the focus of this paper is on the risk associated with the trading portfolio, we cannot properly
evaluate regulation of trading portfolio without explicitly modelling the loan portfolio.  We assume that both the
composition and the financing of the loan portfolio are predetermined.  Let  ˜ x denote the (random) loan portfolio
payoff  in excess of the deposits used to finance the loan portfolio. Random variable ˜ x has the following binomial
distribution: 
Under this specification, default can only occur if there are losses to the trading portfolio.  In this way, we avoid
confounding default induced by market risk with default due to loan portfolio risk.  We further assume that
default can never occur when ˜ x = ¯ x.  A sufficient condition for this is 
Default can occur when ˜ x = 0.  Parameter p measures the quality of the loan portfolio, in the following sense:
The region where ˜ x = ¯ x comprises those realizations of the loan portfolio where default cannot be induced by
trading losses of any magnitude.  Parameter p gives the probability of this region.  As long as equation (6) is˜ J’ (1%$) max{D&˜ x&˜ r,0}
˜ v ’
˜ x %˜ r%R &D, if ˜ x%˜ r $ D,
0 otherwise
  As a formal matter, the portion of this relationship-value that is transferrable can be lumped into the
12




satisfied, the precise value of ¯ x is unimportant for the results of this paper. 
2.3.3.  Franchise value
  In the event of bank failure, a portion of the bank’s value, denoted R, is lost both to the bank
shareholders and to society as a whole.  We refer to R as franchise value.  Intuitively, the value of the bank is
in part determined by the network of relationships it has built up.  This relationship-value is highly information-
sensitive, so is imperfectly transferrable.  We think of franchise value as that portion this relationship-value that
cannot be transferred, sold, or claimed by the deposit insurer in the event of bank failure.   We model R as a
12
predetermined positive parameter. 
2.3.4  Deposit Insurance
The deposit insurer ensures that the depositors of failed banks are paid off in full.  Failure resolution
generates deadweight costs equal to $ times the cash shortfall, where $ $ 0.  The total costs faced by the deposit
insurer are paid via a lump-sum tax ˜ J, assessed ex-post on the households:
Note that we preclude risk-based deposit insurance premiums.  We do so to focus on the issue of capital
regulation.  However, as noted by Berger, Herring, and Szego (1995), deposit insurance premiums in the U.S.
are only weakly tied to the underlying levels of bank asset risk.
2.4 Formal Statement of the Bank's Objective




˜ r%R &D f(˜ r*F)d˜ r & 1 % (1%D)
0 # D # 1
1%D
/Dmax; F0 # F # F.





The bank seeks to maximize the expected value of inside equity, which is given by: 
Equation (9) follows from equations (1), (2), (6) and (8).  In equation (9), D and F must satisfy:
3. THE REGULATOR'S PROBLEM:  COMPUTING THE FIRST-BEST ALLOCATION
In this section, we posit an explicit social welfare criterion.  In contrast to many studies on banking
regulation that impose ad hoc specifications for the regulator's objective, our model has a natural candidate:  We
assume that the regulator seeks to maximize an equally-weighted average of the utilities of the agents in the
economy.  In our economy, there are two types of agents, households and bank insiders, both of whom are risk-
neutral.  Therefore, the regulator's problem is:  
In equation (11), the first term in square brackets gives the bank's contribution to household 
expected wealth (including the liquidity value of deposits).  The second term gives the expected value of inside
bank equity.  Since both types of agents are risk-neutral, equal weighting is the only sensible choice.  If the
weights were unequal, the social optimum would be attained by maximizing the utility of the higher-weighted type
of agent, ignoring the lower-weighted type.  
In our model, maximizing this equally-weighted welfare problem is equivalent to maximizing the




$ D&˜ r % R f(˜ r*F)d˜ r, s.t. equation (
D & (1&p) $F(D*F) % Rf(D*F)
# 0 if D’0
’ 0 if 0 <D<Dmax
$ 0 if D’Dmax





$˜ r&D &R fF(˜ r*F)d˜ r
# 0 if F’F0
’ 0 if F0<F<F







of the bank (R), and taking account of the deadweight costs of failure resolution:
The first-order condition with respect to D is as follows:
where D  is defined in (10).  Note that the optimal default probability is not zero. According to (13), the optimal
max
probability of default when R = 0 (at an interior solution) equals D/$.  When R > 0, the regulator also considers
the marginal expected loss in bank franchise value.  If the solution for D is interior, the following second-order
necessary condition must hold:
Once the optimal D is determined, the optimal capital ratio follows immediately from equation (4). 
    The first-order condition with respect to F is:
Not surprisingly, it can be shown that (ignoring the trivial case of D = 0, where F drops out of the regulator's
problem entirely) the regulator always chooses F = F : 0
Proposition 1:  If  , the social planning optimum sets F = F .  0




D&˜ r f(˜ r*F)d˜ r & (1&p)RF(D*F) , s.t. equation
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(16)
Let the socially optimal level of D be denoted D .  The following comparative static results hold:
*
Proposition 2:  
(i) D  is strictly positive;
*
(ii) If D  < D , then D  is strictly decreasing in R and $;
* max *
(iii) If D  < D , then D  is strictly increasing in D and p.
* max *
Proof: Appendix.
These comparative static results are intuitive.  Increasing p reduces the probability of default, and decreasing $
reduces the cost of default.  Either change reduces the social cost of deposits.  Similarly, increasing D increases
the social benefits to deposits.  Decreasing R decreases the social cost of default, since reducing R reduces the
value of the bank to society. 
4. THE BANK'S OPTIMAL CHOICES IN AN UNREGULATED ECONOMY  
In the previous section we characterized the first-best allocation in this economy.  In this section, we
study the bank's optimization problem in the absence of regulation.  We assume that the bank's choice of trading
portfolio risk, F, cannot be observed by regulators. This creates the potential for moral hazard between the risk
level preferred by the regulator and that selected by the bank.  One of the objectives of regulation will be to
control this moral hazard problem. 
Using equation (9), we can rewrite the bank's problem as:
The first term in parentheses gives the value of the bank under unlimited liability.  The second term gives theD % (1&p)F(D*F) & Rf(D*F)
# 0 if D’0
’ 0 if 0 <D<D max
$ 0 if D’D max





D&˜ r&R fF(˜ r*F)d˜ r
# 0 if F ’ F0
’ 0 if F0<F<F











value of the put option given by the deposit insurer to the bank.  The third term subtracts off the expected lost
franchise value due to default.  The bank first-order condition with respect to D is 
If the solution for D is interior, the following second-order necessary condition must hold:
The first-order condition with respect to F is:
If the solution to (19) is interior, the following second-order necessary condition must hold:
Equations (19) and (20) imply an important property of the bank's optimal choice for F:  The bank never
chooses an interior value for F.  This is shown in the following Proposition:
Proposition 3:  The bank's optimal choice of F is either F  or ¯ F. 0
Proof: Appendix This is easiest to see in terms of a mean preserving spread around a uniform distribution.
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The intuition behind this result is illustrated in Figure 1.  When a bank considers the effects of higher
risk, it trades off the benefits of the deposit insurance put option (the dot-dash line in the figure) against the
potential loss of franchise value (the dotted lines).  Consider the case where franchise value is very low (R  in low
the figure).  As risk is increased, more probability mass is placed on the area at the right edge of the bankruptcy
region.  Here, the (probability weighted) area associated with lost franchise value is larger than the area associated
with the deposit insurance put option.   As risk is increased, more weight is placed on the area further to the left.
13
As one moves into this region, the area under the put option payoff is increasing much faster that the area under
the franchise value line.  It is possible that at some point the expected payoff of the put option begins to dominate.
This is especially likely when franchise value is low.  When franchise value is high (R ), however, the potential hi
loss of franchise value is always the dominant concern to the bank. This analysis implies that the bank’s net
payoff as a function of risk is either (i) always increasing (when franchise value is zero), (ii) initially decreasing
but then uniformly increasing, or (iii) always decreasing.  Since these are the only possible outcomes, the bank
will always select either minimal or maximal risk.
This proposition implies a striking characteristic of bank behavior in this model:  While it is feasible for
banks to choose any value of F in the closed interval [F ,¯ F], their optimal strategy is to choose either F , the 0 0
lowest feasible variance for their trading portfolio, or ¯ F, the highest feasible variance.  In other words, banks self-
select into one of two types:  prudent banks (defined as those who choose F ) and risk-seeking banks (defined 0
as those who chose ¯ F).  Prudent banks are those for whom preservation of franchise value is of paramount
concern, while risk-seeking banks are those for whom the paramount consideration is exploiting the deposit
insurance put option.  Of course, this bifurcation into two, and only two, choices for portfolio variance is specific
to this model.  A more general model that allowed for a limited mean-variance tradeoff (that is, µ increasing in
F) would imply a range of portfolio variances for "prudent" banks.  Still, the key qualitative lesson from




franchise value banks maximally take on uncompensated risk in order to exploit the deposit insurance put
option.
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The following Proposition further characterizes the bank's optimal choices:
Proposition 4:  
(i) The bank's optimal choice of D is strictly positive.
(ii) The bank's problem has at most one local maximum with respect to D.
(iii) At D < D , and for a fixed level of risk F, the bank's optimal choice of D is
max
strictly decreasing in R and strictly increasing in D.  
(iv) If R = 0, the bank's optimal choice of D = D , and the bank's optimal choice of
max
 F = ¯ F.
(v) Holding other structural parameters constant, there exists ¯ R > 0 such that the
bank's optimal choice of F = F , ￿ R > ¯ R, and is F = ¯ F, ￿ R < ¯ R 0
Proof: Appendix
According to Proposition 4 (iv) and (v), the bank trades off franchise value loss against the deposit insurance put
option.  If a bank has no franchise value, it has no disincentive to taking maximal risk.  On the other hand, a
sufficiently high franchise value induces the bank to choose the minimum risk level.
Even if the bank sets F = F , it does not follow that the bank's choices correspond to the first-best.  In 0
general, even prudent banks choose suboptimally low levels of capital relative to the social-planner's optimum.












the regulator's problem is globally concave.
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Proposition 5:  Suppose (21) is satisfied and the bank chooses F = F .  Except in the case where 0
both the bank and the regulator set D = D , the bank's optimal choice of D is strictly above the
max
socially optimal choice of D.
Proof: Appendix
Recall from equations (4) and (10)) that the D  corresponds to zero capital.  Proposition 5 says that the
max
unregulated bank's choices can only correspond to the social optimum in the rather extreme case where deposits
are so valuable (high D) or default has such a low cost (low $) that the regulatory optimum sets bank capital at
zero.  In all other cases, the unregulated bank fails to make the socially optimal choices.
5. REGULATORY MECHANISMS
According to section 4, above, the choices of banks in an unregulated economy are generally suboptimal.
The goals of capital regulation are to induce risk-seeking banks (who would choose F = ¯ F in the absence of
regulation) to behave prudently (that is, to chose F = F ), and to provide them with incentives to hold sufficient 0
capital.  In this section we describe three regulatory mechanisms: ex-ante capital requirements, and two variants
of the Board of Governors' 1995 precommitment proposal.  For each mechanism, we define the optimal
implementation of that mechanism as the implementation whose associated allocation (D, F) achieves the highest













5.1 State Non-contingent Capital Regulation:  Ex-ante capital requirements
Under ex-ante capital requirements, the regulator sets the bank capital ratio, which is equivalent to
choosing a value for D.  The bank then maximizes its profits subject to this capital constraint by choosing its
preferred level of portfolio risk, denoted F (D).  Using (16),
ex
Let D  denote the regulator's choice of D under ex-ante capital requirements.  As long as franchise value is
ex
positive, this mechanism can induce prudent behavior by imposing a sufficiently high capital ratio:




Intuitively, the strike price of the deposit insurance put option is D, which is strictly decreasing in the capital ratio.
By increasing the required capital ratio, this strike price (and therefore the value of the deposit insurance put
option) can be made arbitrarily small.  As long as R > 0, this put-option value can be made sufficiently low that
it is dominated by the bank's concern for preserving franchise value.  However, for very low R's, the required
capital ratio is quite high.  In the limit, when R = 0, the optimal ex-ante capital regulation is 100% capital, which
reduces the put-option value to zero.
5.2 The Basic Precommitment Approach
Under the Board of Governor's precommitment approach, the bank chooses a level K of capital.  This
is interpreted as a commitment that the loss to the trading portfolio, (1 - ˜ r), will not exceed K.  If the loss exceedsN(D,˜ r) ’
0 if (˜ r&1) %K(D) > 0
( (1&˜ r) & K(D) , otherwise
rN(D) / (1%D)D
r
((D) / max 1%((1%D) D &x
(1 %()
, 0 , r((D) / 1%((1%D) D
(1 %()





(1%D)D&˜ r f(˜ r*F)dr










this pre-committed level, a penalty N is imposed that is proportional to the excess loss.  Formally, the penalty
function N(D,˜ r) can be written:
where ( $ 0 is a constant of proportionality.  
We now modify the bank's objective function (16) to incorporate the penalty function N(D,˜ r).  First, we
must fix some additional notation.  Denote the portfolio return that triggers the penalty by r :  where we use
N
equation (4).  We must also determine when the bank is in default under precommitment. In the basic
precommitment approach, we cannot rule out the possibility of default even when the loan portfolio pays off ¯ x.
Let ¯ r  and r  denote the portfolio returns that trigger bankruptcy under precommitment when ˜ x = ¯ x, and ˜ x = 0,
* *
respectively:
Note that if both D > 0 and ( > 0, then r (D) > r (D) > ¯ r (D) for all D > 0. 
N * *
The bank's problem is analogous to equation (16), except that the expected value of N(D,˜ r) is subtracted
off, and bankruptcy when ˜ x = ¯ x is allowed to have non-zero probability: N(D,˜ r,˜ x) ’
0 if (˜ r&1) %K(D) > 0






















(1%D)D&˜ r f(˜ r*F)dr




5.3 Re-Negotiation Proof Precommitment 
In the basic precommitment mechanism, the penalty is imposed even if the penalty itself drives the bank
into default.  This possibility ("hitting them when they're down") has received a fair amount of comment.  Some
argue that to modify the penalty whenever it induces financial distress would constitute forbearance, with all the
associated negative consequences for regulatory credibility.  On the other hand, a penalty that induces default
imposes deadweight societal costs ex post.  This arrangement is clearly not re-negotiation proof:  When there is
imminent danger of a penalty-induced default, both the bank and the regulator can be made better off if the
regulator modifies the penalty to keep the bank solvent. Therefore, in this section we consider an alternative
specification for precommitment in which the penalty function is modified to avoid triggering default.
The renegotiation-proof penalty structure analogous to (23) has the following form: 
The penalty function in (27) is the same as in (23) unless the penalty would induce default, in which case the
regulator imposes the maximum penalty that does not trigger default.  From the bank shareholders' perspective,
the only change is that they keep the bank franchise value unless ˜ r falls below D - ˜ x.  (Here, we are assuming that
if  ˜ r + ˜ x - N exactly equals D, the bank is not technically in default.)  Equation (26) must be changed to: 
6. COMPARISON OF REGULATORY MECHANISMS:  NUMERICAL RESULTS19
In this section, we examine the allocations of risk and capital that can be implemented by the alternative
mechanisms.  We approach this inquiry in two ways.  First,  we choose parameters randomly, numerically solve
the model at each parameterization, and analyze the performance of each type of regulation.  The purpose of this
exercise is  to seek fairly robust general results.  Second, we examine in depth a plausible "baseline"
parameterization, along with perturbations away from the baseline.  
6.1 General Results from Random Numerical Exercises
We select randomly 250 parameter combinations from the following uniform distributions: F  0 [0.001, 0
1]; ¯ F 0 [10, 15]; µ 0 [1.001, 2]; D 0 [0.001, 1]; $ 0 [0.001, 3]; p 0 [0.01, 0.99]; R 0 [0, 3].  Using the results of
these experiments, we determine how the various regulatory mechanisms operate, and we evaluate the approaches
according to both the social welfare criterion and the bank's objective function.
In all our parameterizations, ¯ F is big relative to F .  As a result, the portfolio risk chosen by the bank is 0
the critical determinant of social welfare.  Stated more formally,  
Numerical Result 1: For all of the random parameter draws, an allocation (D , F ) attains a 1 0
higher value of the social welfare criterion (12) than an allocation (D , ¯ F), for any feasible 2
D , D .  1 2
That is, for the parameter ranges we consider, the regulator always seeks to deter risk-seeking behavior, even at
the cost of excessive capital.  
6.1.1 Ex-ante capital regulation
First, let us consider the behavior of the bank under the ex-ante capital regulation described in section
5.1, above.  Numerical Result 2 characterizes the function F (D), defined in (22):
ex If D  = ¯ D, the bank is indifferent between F  and ¯ F.  We assume that the bank chooses the prudent risk level
16 ex
0
F  in this case. 0
20
Numerical Result 2: For all 250 random parameter draws, we find that  
(i) if R > 0, there exists a critical level ¯ D $ 0 such that
F (D) = F , ￿ D # ¯ D, and
ex
0
F (D) = ¯ F, ￿ D > ¯ D;
ex
(ii) ¯ D = 0 if and only if R = 0.
(iii)  ¯ D is strictly increasing in R. 
Figure 2 illustrates Numerical Result 2.  If the regulator imposes stringent capital requirements (i.e. D
is 'sufficiently low') the bank behaves prudently, setting F = F .  As these capital requirements are lowered (D is 0
increased), a point is reached beyond which the bank switches from prudent behavior to risk-seeking behavior
(i.e. it selects ¯ F).  We denote this switching point by ¯ D.
16
 Numerical Result 2 enables us to characterize when ex-ante capital requirements can achieve the first-
best allocation:  
Numerical Result 3:  For all 250 random parameter draws,  the first-best allocation (D , F ) is
*
0
attained by ex-ante capital requirements if and only if D  # ¯ D. 
*
That is, if mandating D  induces the bank to behave prudently, ex-ante capital requirements can implement the
*
first-best allocation. 
6.1.2 State contingent regulation:  The precommitment approach
We now turn to bank behavior under the precommitment mechanism.  Let D (() and F (() denote the
pc pc21
bank's optimal choices of D and F under precommitment when the penalty function parameter equals (.  These
functions are characterized in Numerical Result 4: 
Numerical Result 4:  For all random parameter draws, and for both variants of precommitment,
(i)   for fixed F=F , if D (()<D ,  D (() is strictly decreasing in (; 0
pc max pc
(ii) for very low values of p and R, F (() = ¯ F, ￿ (.
pc
(iii)  for p and R sufficiently high, there exists ¯ ( < 4 s.t. 
F (() = F , ￿ ( $ ¯ (, and
pc
0
F (() = ¯ F, ￿ ( < ¯ (.
pc
Part (i) of Numerical Result 4 is intuitive: If the bank is already acting prudently, increasing the penalty induces
the bank to increase its capital level.  (If the bank sets F = ¯ F, we find that the bank also sets D = D , so D is
max
unresponsive to small changes in (.)   According to part (ii) of Numerical Result 4, there may not exist a finite
( that induces banks to behave prudently.  Intuitively, ( = 4 would mean that any loss to the trading portfolio
results in immediate default, with consequent closure of the bank.  If the costs of default to the bank insiders are
sufficiently small, (because p and R are sufficiently small) and the benefits from exploiting the deposit insurance
put option are sufficiently large, even this draconian penalty might be insufficient to deter risk-seeking behavior.
Barring this case, there exists a critical value of the penalty parameter (denoted ¯ () above which the bank will set
F = F .  That is, the penalty can be set sufficiently high so that an otherwise risk-seeking bank behaves prudently. 0
The only cases we found where ¯ ( did not exist were when p < 0.4 and R < 0.3.  These parameterizations
represent very poor quality banks:  A value of p < 0.4 implies that with probability exceeding 60% the value of
the loan portfolio would fall below the face value of deposits, leaving the bank vulnerable to trading-induced
default.  Such a bank would clearly be considered extremely troubled, and would be subject to prompt corrective
action under FDICIA.22
For all other parameterizations, ¯ ( exists.  Figures 3a and 3b illustrate the way precommitment functions.
When ( > ¯ (, the bank selects the low risk F .  In this region, increasing ( induces the bank to increase capital 0
(reduce D).  The location of ¯ ( determines whether precommitment can implement the optimal allocation:
Numerical Result 5:  Let (  denote the regulator's optimal choice of the precommitment penalty
*
parameter.  For all random parameter draws 
(i) If ¯ ( < 4 exists and D  # D (¯ (), precommitment can implement the first-best
* pc
allocation (D , F ), and (  is defined by D  = D (( ).
* * * pc *
0
(ii) If ¯ ( < 4 exists and D  > D (¯ (), precommitment cannot implement the first-best
* pc
allocation, and (  = ¯ (. 
*
Numerical Result 6 describes the way (  varies with bank characteristics.
*
Numerical Result 6:  For all of the random parameter draws where ¯ ( < 4 exists and where D  is
*
interior (that is, D  < D ),  (  is strictly decreasing in  R and p for both basic
* max *
precommitment and re-negotiation proof precommitment.
6.1.3 Comparison of the regulatory mechanisms
In this section, we compare the various regulatory approaches according to the social welfare criterion.
According to Numerical Result 1, the critical task of bank regulation is to induce banks to behave prudently.
According to Proposition 6, ex-ante capital requirements can always do this (although, as we shall see, the
requisite capital ratios can be extremely high for low R's).  According to Numerical Result 4(ii), precommitment
cannot always do this.  It follows that, when p and  R are very low, ex-ante capital requirements dominate




When there exists a finite ¯ ( (in Numerical Result 4(iii)), precommitment can induce prudent behavior.
For most such parameterizations, basic precommitment weakly dominates ex-ante capital requirements in the
following sense: 
Numerical Result 7: For most cases where ¯ ( exists,
(i) When ex-ante capital regulation can achieve the first-best allocation, the basic
precommitment approach can also achieve the first-best allocation.
(ii) For parameterizations where ex-ante capital regulation fails to achieve the first-best
allocation, the optimal implementation of the basic precommitment approach attains a
strictly higher value of both the social welfare criterion and the bank's objective function
than ex-ante capital regulation.
In particular, of the 250 random parameter draws, we found only two parameterizations where a value  ¯ ( exists
(so precommitment could induce prudent behavior) but where ex-ante capital requirements attains a strictly higher
value of the social welfare criterion than precommitment.   For the remaining parameterizations where ¯ ( exists,
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precommitment dominates ex-ante capital requirements according to both the social welfare criterion and the
bank's objective function.  We conclude that precommitment provides a superior regulatory environment unless
franchise value or loan portfolio quality are extremely low.
In Numerical Result 8, we find a similar weak domination of basic precommitment by re-negotiation
proof precommitment.
Numerical Result 8:  For all random parameter draws, where ¯ ( exists (in the sense of Numerical
Result 4(iii)) for renegotiation-proof precommitment,24
(i) Whenever basic precommitment can achieve the first-best allocation, re-negotiation proof
precommitment approach can also achieve the first-best allocation.
(ii) For all parameterizations where basic precommitment fails to achieve the first-best
allocation, the optimal implementation of re-negotiation proof precommitment attains a
strictly higher value of both the social welfare criterion and the bank's objective function
than basic precommitment.
According to Numerical Result 8, it is not necessarily bad to reduce the severity of regulatory sanctions for a weak
bank.  (Gorton and Winton (1995) arrive at a similar conclusion.)  However, one should build that contingency
explicitly into the regulation.  This does not constitute "forbearance", since the regulator is in no way failing to
enforce the regulation as written. 
6.2 Numerical results for specific parameterizations
In this section, we display detailed results for a "baseline" parameterization, and we discuss perturbations
away from the baseline.  We think of the length of each period as one year.  We set D = 0.05, implying a 5%
annual return differential between monetary and non-monetary assets.  We set  µ = 1.04, which gives the bank's
trading portfolio a risk-adjusted premium of 4% over the risk-free rate.  To calibrate $, we note that if R = 0, the
socially-optimal bank failure rate equals D/$.  It would be difficult to justify the optimality of a failure rate above
5% per year, even with zero franchise value, so we set $ = D/.05 = 1.  Literally interpreted, this value of $ implies
that the deadweight loss due to failure resolution equals 100% of the failed bank's shortfall.  This high value can
be justified if we think of $ as a parameter summarizing all of the factors that make bank failure costly from a
social welfare standpoint.  These factors might include costs of systemic risk, loss of confidence in the banking
system, and losses due to the portion of bank deposits that is uninsured.
The remaining parameters in our baseline case are as follows:  We set F  = 0.10 (so the minimum 025
standard deviation for the trading portfolio return is 10%).  The value of ¯ F has little effect on the results, provided
it is high enough to approximate infinite risk.   We set ¯ F = 10.  The exact value of ¯ x does not affect bank or
regulatory choices as long as it is sufficiently large to preclude trading-induced default, including defaults
triggered by the penalty in the basic precommitment approach.  We set ¯ x = 4.  The bank-specific parameters are
R (franchise value, as a fraction of the ex-ante value of the trading portfolio) and p (the probability of loan
portfolio outcomes where default has zero probability).  We explore the following ranges:  R 0 [0, 1.5]; p 0 [0.2,
0.95].
In Figure 4, we fix p = 0.8 and we vary R, while Figure 5 fixes R at 0.5 and varies p.  For both figures,
Panel A displays the capital ratios K(D) for the regulatory optimum (solid line), the unregulated bank's optimum
(dotted line), and the optimal implementation of ex-ante capital regulation (dashed line), while Panel B gives
capital ratios for the optimal implementation of the basic precommitment approach (dashed line), and the re -
negotiation proof precommitment (dotted line).  The regulatory optimum is also displayed as the solid line in
Panel B.  (Note that the vertical scale differs from the vertical scale in Panel A.)   Consider first Figure 4.  For
all values of R below 0.84 the unregulated bank is risk-seeking, choosing zero capital and setting F = ¯ F.  For R
$ 0.84, the unregulated bank sets F = F  and chooses capital ratios only slightly below the regulatory optimum. 0
In this sense, high franchise-value banks are almost self-regulating.  For low values of R, ex-ante capital
regulation induces prudent behavior, but only by imposing very high capital requirements.  For example, when
R = 0.1, the optimal ex-ante capital requirement equals 85% of the trading portfolio.  As R increases, the optimal
capital requirement falls dramatically.  For R $ 0.69, ex-ante capital regulation achieves the first-best allocation.
For example, with R = 1, ex-ante capital regulation achieves the first-best allocation with a capital requirement
of 14.2%.
Panel B of Figure 4 shows that, for all values of R, the basic precommitment specification induces banks
to choose F = F .  However, for positive values of R less than 0.69, the optimal precommitment specification 0
induces banks to overcapitalize slightly, relative to the regulatory optimum.  When R = 0, precommitment attains26
the socially optimal capital ratio of zero.  Intuitively, with R = 0 the bank has little value to society.  The marginal
social cost of mandating positive capital exceeds the marginal social value of reducing the default risk for such
a low-value bank.   Panel B of Figure 4 also illustrates the weak domination of basic precommitment by
re-negotiation proof precommitment.  Notice that when the capital level induced by the latter differs from the
regulatory optimum, it is always closer to the regulatory optimum than the capital level induced by the basic
precommitment approach.
Panels A and B of Figure 5 show that the first-best capital ratio and the capital ratios under the optimal
implementations of precommitment fall as p increases.  In this example the optimal ex-ante capital requirement
(dashed line in Panel A) is unaffected by p.  The reason for this is that  ¯ D is invariant to p.  (This follows from
equation (19).)  For the parameterization of Figure 5, D  always equals ¯ D, so ex-ante capital requirements fail
ex
to achieve the first-best allocation.  In contrast, basic precommitment achieves the first-best for p $ 0.9, and re-
negotiation proof precommitment does so for p $ 0.5.  
An important question is whether precommitment requires extremely harsh penalties.  Panels C and D
of Figures 4 and 5 provide some answers.  Panel C plots (  under the basic precommitment mechanism (solid
*
line) and re-negotiation proof precommitment (dashed line).  Consider first Figure 4.  When R = 0, (  = 0.241,
*
implying a fine slightly less that 25% of the portfolio loss in excess of the pre-committed amount.  As franchise
value increases, (  decreases rapidly.  The magnitude of these fines are non-trivial, but they are not unreasonably
*
large.  Furthermore, when we perturb parameters {F , D, µ, $} away from our baseline (keeping p = 0.8, as in 0
Figure 4), (  changes only modestly.  For example, when we double portfolio risk by increasing F  from 0.10 to
*
0
0.20, the value of (  for R = 0 rises from 0.24 to 0.35 under both precommitment mechanisms. Similarly, a 50%
*
increase in the cost of default (from $ = 1.0 to $ = 1.5) increases (  from 0.24 to 0.30 when R = 0. 
*
According to Figure 4, Panel C, (  for re-negotiation proof precommitment is considerably higher than
*
that for the basic precommitment approach, except for the lowest levels of R.  For example, when R = 1, the
optimal  implementation of basic precommitment uses a (  of only 3.2%, while re-negotiation proof
*27
precommitment sets (  = 11.9%.  This is no surprise: For a given (, re-negotiation proof precommitment imposes
*
a less onerous penalty than basic precommitment, so a higher value of ( is needed to have the same effect on bank
incentives. 
  Figure 5, Panel C, shows how sensitive the optimal precommitment penalty is to the quality of the loan
portfolio.  When p = 0.2 (the poorest quality loan portfolio we examine), the optimal precommitment penalty
requires ( . 150%.  However, we regard this value of p as unrealistically low.  When p is increased to 0.95
(implying that, even with a total loss to the trading portfolio, the bank will be solvent 95% of the time), the
optimal values of ( are only 3.8% with basic precommitment and 4.4% with re-negotiation proof precommitment.
Panel D of Figures 4 and 5 illustrates the impact of the penalty function.  In Figure 4, the probability that
the penalty is imposed (dotted line) ranges from 31.5% (for R = 0) down to 2% (for the higher values of R).
Conditional on the penalty being imposed, the average penalty (solid line) ranges from 0.014 for R = 0 (that is,
1.4% of the value of the trading portfolio) to less than 0.0009 (0.09% of the value of the trading portfolio) for
R's above 1.0.  As with Panel C, these results do not imply a particularly burdensome penalty, except possibly
for the lowest franchise values.  Figure 5 shows that the probability that the penalty is imposed increases sharply
for the highest values of p, even as the expected magnitude of the penalty falls.  That is, a very high quality of
the loan portfolio reduces the expected social costs associated with poor performance in the trading portfolio, so
the regulator views precommitment violations as less dangerous. 
Finally, we have chosen a value of ¯ x sufficiently large that the precommitment penalty never triggers
default when ˜ x = ¯ x.   The dashed line in Panel D gives the probability that the penalty triggers default when ˜ x =
0.  According to Figure 4, this happens 2.9% of the time for R = 0.  However, this probability falls off rapidly
as R increases, becoming negligible (less than 0.5%) for R's over 0.25.  According to Figure 5, this probability
is unaffected by changes in p. 28
7. CONCLUSIONS
Our model provides a precise characterization of the conflicts between regulators, who seek to enhance
public welfare, and banks who act as private value maximizers.  It implies that banks either behave prudently or
seek maximal uncompensated risk, but do not choose intermediate risk levels.  In this environment, the most
important role of the regulator is to induce the risk-seeking banks to behave prudently, by switching to a low level
of risk.  While traditional ex-ante capital requirements can induce prudent behavior even for the most risk-seeking
of banks, the needed capital ratios are often inefficiently high.  The precommitment approach cannot always
induce prudent behavior, especially  with the poorest quality banks.  This result supports the provision in the
Board of Governors' 1995 proposal that prohibits weak banks from using precommitment to set capital
requirements.  For most other bank types, precommitment is generally preferable to ex-ante capital regulation,
both according to the social welfare criterion and according to the bank's objective function.  Furthermore, the
optimal precommitment penalty levels, while non-trivial, are not excessively large.
Given the simplicity of the precommitment mechanism, we find these results striking.  They support the
work currently being done to explore precommitment as an alternative to the current structure of capital
regulation.  More generally, they suggest that substantial efficiency gains can be obtained by moving away from
ex-ante capital requirements towards structures that seek to modify the ex-ante behavior of regulated firms via
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The following Lemma is used in the proof of Proposition 1.
Lemma A.1:  (i)  F (r|F) > 0, ￿r < µ; F
   (ii)  .
Proof of (i):  The cumulative log-normal distribution function can be written:
where
In (a.1), µ  and F  are the mean and variance of the normal distribution to which the log-normal corresponds. n n
Differentiating F(r|F) with respect to F, one obtains:




















D # D max / 1
1%D
< 1 # µ
F(0|F) ’ f(0|F) ’ 0
 Note that the only property of the log-normal distribution used in this proof is that F (r) > 0, ￿r < µ.  This
18
F
property holds for most distribution functions typically used to model portfolio returns, so the proposition is
more general than for the log-normal returns assumed here. Indeed, if the portfolio return distribution did not
satisfy this property, then value-at-risk might be decreasing in F, in which case portfolio variance would
arguably be a poor measure of portfolio risk.  Also note that, in Proposition 1, we exclude the case of D = 0




where the final inequality is implied by r < µ.
Proof of (ii): With the log-normal distribution, an increase in F without changing µ represents a mean-preserving
spread.  This immediately implies the result.   (See Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970).
￿
Proof of Proposition 1: To prove the proposition, it is sufficient to show that the left-hand side of (15) is strictly
negative for all D > 0.  To that end, we use integration by parts to  write the left-hand side of (15) as
Since  ,  Lemma A.1 implies that both terms in the bracketed expression in (a.5)
are strictly positive.  This implies the conclusion of the Proposition.    ￿
18
Proof of Proposition 2:
Proof of (i): Note that  , ￿F.  Since D > 0, the left-hand side of (13) is strictly positive at D
= 0, implying that D = 0 is never an optimum.& (1&p) $f(D*F)dD
dR
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Proof of (ii) and (iii):  D  is interior, so we can totally differentiate the first-order condition (13), first with respect
*
to R, second with respect to $, third with respect to D, and fourth with respect to p, to obtain
  
implying 
where the final inequalities are implied by second-order condition (14).   ￿
The following Lemma is required for the proof of Proposition 3.





































































Proof: The numerator of the object in brackets in (a.8) is 
The denominator of the object in brackets in (a.8) is given by equation (a.3).  Taking the ratio of (a.9) to (a.3),
substituting definitions from (a.2) and doing a bit of algebra, one obtains
The derivative of the right-hand side of (a.10) has the same sign as 
where the final inequality follows from r < µ. ￿
Proof of Proposition 3:
To prove the proposition, it is sufficient to show that (20) cannot hold if (19) holds at equality.  Equation (19)
holding at equality can be written:
where we use   and  .  (The latter result uses the fact that

















































order condition (20) can be written
Let us assume towards a contradiction that, for some (D,F) combination, (a.12) and (a.13) both hold.  Lemma
A.1 (along with D# D  < 1 # µ, implied by (12)) implies that F (D) > 0, so (a.12) implies 
max
F
Substituting (a.14) into (a.13), and rearranging, we obtain
Equation (a.15) can only hold if 
However, in Lemma A.2 (proved earlier), it is demonstrated that, for any fixed r < µ, 
Equations (a.16) and (a.17) provide the needed contradiction.  ￿
The following Lemma is required for the proof of Proposition 4.
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where the first equality in (a.18) uses integration by parts, and the second equality uses equation (a.11).
Differentiating the right-hand side of (a.18) with respect to r, one obtains  
,
where the inequality follows from r < µ. ￿
Proof of Proposition 4:
Proof of (i): Note that F(0|F) = f(0|F) = 0, ￿F.  Since D > 0, the left-hand side of (17) evaluated at D=0 equals
D > 0,  implying that D = 0 is never an optimum.
Proof of (ii):  We show that there exists ¯ D such that the second derivative of the bank's objective function with
respect to D (which is the left-hand side of (18)) is nonpositive for D #  ¯ D and is positive for D >  ¯ D.  Using
 and  , one can evaluate the left-hand side
of (18) as:
.
The object in brackets is strictly increasing in D.  In particular, there exists a unique   ¯ D > 0 such that
.  For D <  ¯ D the left-hand side of (18) is nonpositive; for D > ¯ D the left-hand
side of (18) is positive.




























D.  Therefore, part (iii) of the proposition can be proved by totally differentiating the interior solution case in
equation (17), first with respect to R, and second with respect to D. The derivatives MD/MRt and MD/MD can then
be signed by using the second-order condition (17). 
Proof of (iv):  If R = 0, the left-hand side of (17) equals D + F(D|F) > 0, so D = D .  To prove that the banks
max
optimal F = ¯ F in this case, note that the left-hand side of (19) can be written: 
where the equality in (a.19) uses integration by parts.  If R = 0, the right-hand side of (a.19) is positive.
Proof of (v):  According to Lemma A.3, for any given F,   ￿ r < µ. Therefore,
For any R greater than the object in brackets on the left-hand side of (a.20), the left-hand side of (19) is strictly
negative (see equation (a.19)), implying that the optimal F = F .   ￿ 0
Proof of Proposition 5:
Under the conditions of this Proposition, (and using Propositions 2(i) and 4(i)) both the regulator's optima l
deposit level, D, and the bank's optimal deposit level (denoted D ) represent interior solutions to the respective
* B
agent's first-order conditions (13) and (17).  Condition (21) ensures that this solution for the regulator's problem
is unique.  Note that, for any given D, the left-hand side of (17) lies strictly above the left-hand side of (13).  Note
also that, according to Propositions 2(i) and 4(i), the left-hand side of both (13) and (17) are strictly positive.
Finally, Proposition 4(ii) states that the left-hand side of (17) attains a value of zero at no more than one value
of D.  These facts together imply that if both D  and D  are interior, then D  > D .  
* B B *
￿




























for F = F , ¯ F.  It is sufficient to demonstrate that  0
For the log normal distribution, f (0*F) = 0, so the ratio on the left-hand side of equation (a.21) is an F
indeterminate form.  Repeated application of l'Hôpital's rule verifies equation (a.21). ￿REFERENCES
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